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1541 
FOR BETTER OR WORSE: A DISCUSSION OF 
THE BIA’S AMBIGUOUS C-Y-Z DECISION AND 
ITS LEGACY FOR REFUGEES OF CHINA’S ONE 
CHILD POLICY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The One Child Policy (the “Policy”) is a system of laws under which 
China seeks to control its large population and national resources, often 
leading to extreme and tragic consequences.1 Despite reports of 
improvements to the harsh Policy,2 evidence suggests that Chinese 
nationals are still victimized by this coercive family planning strategy. 
Although China originally implemented the Policy to serve as a catalyst 
for social and economic development,3 it has proven significantly less 
effective at igniting progress than the more liberal family planning 
schemes of other countries.4  
In addition to China’s stunted economic development, the Policy’s 
severe rules and its often violent implementation have caused citizens to 
flee the country.5 Many Chinese nationals hoping to escape the Policy 
come to the United States.6 Historically, upon arrival victims have been 
found to be ineligible for asylum.7 While the advent of recent legislation 
 
 
 1.  See China: Human Rights Violations and Coercion in One-Child Policy Enforcement: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On International Relations, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Hearing] 
(statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, Member, H. Comm. on International Relations) (“According 
to the State Department report . . . [the Policy has] caused an upwards of 500 suicides by women 
[daily].”). 
 2. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 24 (statement of Asst. Sec. Dewey, Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration) (stating that innovations such as a hotline for reporting “abusive family 
planning practices” and the elimination of legislation requiring birth permits are encouraging). 
 3. See Gu Baochang, Fertility: From the 1970s to 1990s, in CHINA: THE MANY FACETS OF 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 69, 71 (Alice Goldstein & Wang Feng eds., 1996) (“The fundamental and 
explicit purpose of China’s family planning programs has been to slow population growth so as to 
reduce its burden on the country and facilitate its modernization.”). 
 4. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Hon. Tom Lantos, Member, H. Comm. on 
International Relations) (“Developing countries that invest in health and education and enable women 
to make their own fertility choices have also registered faster economic growth than those that do 
not.”). 
 5. According to the 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, for example, in the 2005 fiscal 
year over 30,000 Chinese immigrants became naturalized U.S. citizens. See 2005 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 53, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/OIS_2005_ 
Yearbook.pdf. This figure only considers naturalized citizens, and thus excludes those who immigrate 
and never attain that coveted status. 
 6. Id. 
 7. For an example of one circuit’s rationale for denying asylum eligibility, see infra notes 111–
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provides asylum eligibility for those directly victimized under the Policy,8 
jurisdictions have split over the eligibility of these victims’ spouses. 
Consequently, there is disagreement as to which Chinese citizens qualify 
as Policy victims for purposes of asylum eligibility.9 Due to different 
interpretations of the legislation, circuits inconsistently grant or deny 
eligibility for asylum to these individuals.10  
This inconsistency renders the legislation ineffective, especially as to 
those who are not legally married. While some circuits liberally grant 
eligibility to couples who have not participated in a legal marriage 
ceremony,11 more restrictive jurisdictions limit eligibility to those couples 
whose marriages are legally acknowledged by the Chinese government.12 
Moreover, ambiguity also surrounds the eligibility of other family 
members.13 The overall uncertainty regarding asylum eligibility renders 
recent legislation14 ineffective by frustrating the legislature’s intent to help 
Policy victims.15  
The increased number of Chinese citizens driven to United States 
shores by the Policy forces courts to confront a cultural anomaly.16 Due to 
the Policy’s restrictions on the legal age of marriage,17 many Chinese 
participate in traditional wedding ceremonies.18 These ceremonies, while 
not legally recognized, enable younger individuals to establish their 
commitment to each other.19 Determining the asylum eligibility of these 
couples forces American courts to confront the idea of the traditional, yet 
legally prohibited, marriage. To what extent will the United States 
recognize such unions? 
This Note proposes a unified system of standards for determining 
which Chinese fleeing the Policy are granted eligibility for asylum.20 By 
 
 
20 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra note 63. 
 9. See infra notes 87–120 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 87–120 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 87–110 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 132–40 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 63.  
 15. See infra note 109. 
 16. See infra note 90. 
 17. See infra note 32. 
 18. See infra note 90. 
 19. See infra note 90. 
 20. This Note is predominately concerned with the asylum eligibility of couples—those married 
traditionally, legally, and those not married at all. However, the eligibility of other family members 
such as parents will also be discussed briefly, as the policy reasons behind granting or denying their 
eligibility are analogous. Other types of relief such as the withholding of deportation and voluntary 
departure are beyond the scope of this Note. For definitions of these types of relief, see infra note 58. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/5
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granting traditionally married couples asylum eligibility, the United States 
combats the harsh age restrictions of the Policy,21 while simultaneously 
considering issues of practicality.22 In order to determine eligibility for 
traditionally married couples, courts should consider five factors: (1) 
whether the couple has any children; (2) the age of the applicants; (3) 
sworn testimony; (4) the presence of documentation denying the legal 
marriage or levying penalties for violations of the Policy; and (5) any 
other relevant concerns.23 Part II of this Note discusses the history of the 
Policy and U.S. legislation aimed at combating its harsh implementation.24 
Part II also describes the incongruent rulings of American circuit courts on 
the asylum eligibility of those fleeing the Policy.25 Part III analyzes the 
current state of the law, and Part IV proposes a set of uniform standards by 
which to assess the asylum eligibility of traditionally married couples and 
describes how these standards will further legislative intent.26  
II. HISTORY 
A. The History and Current Status of the Policy 
The Policy was first implemented in 1979.27 Although typically 
thought of as a clear-cut reaction to unmanageable overpopulation, it was 
actually the result of a complex combination of social and economic 
factors.28 Throughout the Mao era, which is generally considered to date 
from the late 1940s to 1976, China’s population grew at exponential rates 
as the government aimed to increase productivity by maintaining a large 
 
 
 21. See infra note 32. 
 22. See infra note 117. 
 23. See infra notes 181, 196 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 27–67 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 68–145 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 148–97 and accompanying text. 
 27. Alice Goldstein, The Many Facets of Change and Their Interrelations, 1950–1990, in CHINA: 
THE MANY FACETS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 3 (Alice Goldstein & Wang Feng eds., 1996). 
 28. Wang Feng, A Decade of the One-Child Policy: Achievements and Implications, in CHINA: 
THE MANY FACETS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE, supra note 3, at 98 (citing Xinxia Zhang, On the 
Background of the One Child Policy, in COLLECTION OF RESEARCH MATERIALS ON THE SINGLE CHILD 
PROBLEM (Sociology Dep’t, Beijing: Peking University ed. 1985)). Feng states: 
[P]olicymakers in Beijing had three reasons for launching the ambitious and, to many 
observers, inconceivable one-child per couple population policy: (1) an already huge 
population base of 1 billion by the end of the 1970s, (2) the shift of focus of the [Communist] 
Party’s work from revolution to developing economy (modernization), and (3) the fact that a 
rapid fertility decline had already proved possible. 
Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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workforce.29 However, as early as the 1950s, the government saw the large 
population as an impediment to economic development.30  
Family planning strategies were first introduced in China in the late 
1970s.31 Rather than regulating births, these early programs encouraged 
couples to refrain from marriage until their mid-twenties.32 By delaying 
marriage, the Chinese government hoped to lower the population and 
bolster economic development.33 
When these early efforts proved ineffective, the Chinese government 
introduced the Policy in 1979.34 Initially, the Policy was a system of 
rewards and punishments based upon the number of children in a family.35 
Unlike the earlier programs, the Policy was not concerned with the age of 
marriage, but instead focused solely on the number of children born to 
each family.36 
While the Policy has been persistently enforced in China since its 
inception, it has evolved over time and varies throughout the nation.37 For 
example, the Policy has never been applied uniformly to all citizens; its 
implementation has varied depending on factors such as the ethnicity of 
 
 
 29. See Kimberly Sicard, Section 601 of IIRIRA: A Long Road to Resolution of United States 
Asylum Policy Regarding Coercive Methods of Population Control, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 927, 928 
(2000) (“In the 1950s, the Communist leadership under Chairman Mao encouraged population growth 
because of the belief that a large population would help achieve production and construction 
goals . . . .”); see also Leaders and Dictators: Mao Zedong, http://www.time.com/time/time100/ 
leaders/profile/mao.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (describing Mao’s reign). 
 30. Goldstein, supra note 27, at 7. 
 31. Id. (“Nationwide, strongly enforced family planning policies came into effect in 1970. 
National policy was summed up in the slogan wan, xi, shao (later, longer, fewer): late marriage, longer 
spacing between children, and fewer children.”). 
 32. Id. at 8 (commenting that traditionally, women in China married at a young age). However, 
China’s First Marriage Law set the mandatory ages for legal marriage at eighteen for women and 
twenty for men, while in 1981 the New Marriage Law raised these ages to twenty and twenty-two, 
respectively. Id. 
 33. See Goldstein, supra note 27, at 7. However, in the late 1970s, Chinese leaders became aware 
that the age structure meant that “the population would continue to grow . . . despite the 
[contemporary] family planning policy.” Id. Because of the vast numbers of young Chinese, legislation 
mandating age of marriage was insufficient to curb the perceived overpopulation issue. Id. 
 34. See Goldstein, supra note 27. 
 35. See id. at 7. Goldstein explains that “[i]n January 1979 the [Policy] was launched with a 
series of rewards for those women who bore only one child, and punishments for women who had 
more than two.” However, “in the ensuing years, punishments were also meted out to any woman who 
exceeded one birth.” Id. 
 36. See Gu, supra note 3, at 74. According to Gu, “[t]he family planning program in China in the 
1980s gave great attention to the number of children ever born per woman, but overlooked the timing 
of marriage and childbearing, particularly the first birth.” Id. That is, the period immediately following 
the institution of the Policy was marked by “the shift of orientation from ‘later, longer, fewer’ to 
‘advocating one child per couple.’” Id.  
 37. Feng, supra note 28, at 101. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/5
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the couple.38 Furthermore, the Policy’s inconsistent application can also be 
attributed to the vast geographical diversity of China.39 
Today, although its methods of implementation vary across China, the 
Policy is enforced by all levels of the government.40 While there are 
claims that the Policy is enforced less stringently today,41 reports of its 
harsh tenets and inhumane regulations persist.42 Consequently, the United 
States continues to recognize that it must take a strong stance against the 
Policy.43 
B. United States Asylum Procedure Overview 
Any alien in the United States may apply for asylum.44 The Attorney 
General has discretion to grant asylum if the alien is a “refugee” as defined 
by the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”).45 While the INA 
officially vests this discretion with the Attorney General, immigration 
judges (“IJs”) act for the Attorney General in evaluating the claims of 
 
 
 38. Id. Feng describes the inequitable application of the Policy: “From the start, exceptions were 
made, for example, for minority ethnic groups, remarried couples without their own children, and 
couples with retarded or handicapped children.” Id.  
 39. Id. Feng gives an example of this fluctuation. “A major relaxation of [the Policy] occurred in 
1984, when in many rural areas couples with only one female child were allowed to have a second 
birth, and in mountainous and extremely poor areas, all couples were allowed to have a second birth.” 
Id. He also alludes to the variation in Policy implementation in different geographic areas: 
“Nevertheless, [the Policy] remains fully implemented in urban areas and, whenever possible, in rural 
areas.” Id.  
 40. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 34 (statement of Harry Wu, Executive Director, Laogai 
Research Foundation) (“The [Policy] is a national policy mandated from the top level of the Chinese 
Communist Party Government, which holds all officials of every level and every work unit responsible 
for carrying out the [Policy], from the provincial government level to the tiniest of villages.”); see also 
Gu, supra note 3, at 71 (“The program is endorsed by the national government as one of the nation’s 
priorities and has its own hierarchical organization from the central level down to the village and the 
neighborhood community; . . . [it is] designed to raise the societal awareness of the urgency of 
population control.”).  
 41. See Hearing, supra note 1, at 24. 
 42. See id. at 1–3 (statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith) (discussing story of a woman who 
lost her job and was subject to physical abuse as a result of protesting the Policy). 
 43. Id. at 9 (statement of Hon. Tom Lantos). 
 44. Jiu Shu Wang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 152 Fed. App’x 761, 767 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 45. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). The INA defines “refugee” as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a 
person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually 
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion. 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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refugees seeking asylum.46 To establish asylum eligibility, the alien must 
establish (1) past persecution on the basis of a protected ground;47 or (2) a 
well-founded fear of future persecution due to this protected ground.48 The 
standard for persecution is high, and must surpass mere harassment.49 The 
fear of persecution must also be both “subjectively genuine and 
objectively reasonable.”50 Furthermore, a showing of past persecution 
creates the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution.51 
After an immigration judge (IJ) makes a determination on a case, the 
parties may appeal this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA).52 Due to the BIA’s status as an administrative agency, its 
interpretations of immigration statutes are entitled to Chevron deference.53 
This deference requires courts to adhere to an agency’s interpretation of 
statutes it administers if the statute is ambiguous and the agency’s 
construction of it is permissible.54 
C. Pre-IIRIRA Legislation and Case Law 
Originally, under United States law, individuals fleeing the Policy had 
no claim for asylum eligibility.55 The Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) and the subsequent Refugee Act of 1980 failed to protect this 
category of applicant in the statutory definition of “refugee.”56 Under the 
 
 
 46. Guang Run Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)–
(b)).  
 47. Protected grounds include race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(2000). Furthermore, “the past persecution that [an 
applicant] has endured makes her eligible for asylum; the next question is whether she is entitled to 
asylum as a matter of discretion.” Rodriguez-Matamoros v. INS, 86 F.3d 158, 161 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 48. Wang, 152 Fed. App’x at 768 (citing Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1230–31 
(11th Cir. 2005)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. (citing Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001)). 
 52. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 422 (1999). 
 53. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 54. Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842). The Aguirre Court stated that 
Chevron deference applies to the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act due to 
the Attorney General’s discretion in enforcing the statute, the vesting of this discretion in the BIA, and 
the importance of maintaining the executive branch’s authority in immigration issues. The Court stated 
that “the BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete 
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.’” Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425, (citing INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 448–49 (1987)). 
 55. See Sicard, supra note 29, at 931 (citing Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 
102 (1980) (codified in various sections of 8 U.S.C.)). This statute amended the INA and established 
the procedures for granting asylum to refugees. Id.  
 56. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000) [hereinafter INA]. 
Under this statute, “refugees” are those fleeing persecution on the grounds of race, religion, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/5
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INA, the BIA decided the seminal case In re Chang in 1989.57 In this case, 
the BIA heard the appeal of a man whose application for asylum had been 
denied by an IJ.58 The applicant testified that the Chinese government 
attempted to coerce his family to abide by the Policy, and that he was 
afraid to return to China due to this coercion.59 Under these facts, the BIA 
dismissed the appeal for asylum.60 The BIA concluded that the Policy was 
not facially “persecutive.”61 Because the Policy was not persecutive, the 
BIA ruled that asylum claims stemming from it were without merit.62 
D. The IIRIRA and Case Law in its Wake 
In 1996, with the passing of section 601 of the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Congress amended 
the INA and expanded the category of individuals considered “refugees” 
to include those fleeing the Policy.63 This legislation was enacted, in part, 
 
 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a social group. Id.; see also supra note 45. 
 57. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989) (denying asylum eligibility to individual whose 
application was based solely on his subjection to the Policy), superseded by statute, Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601, 110 Stat. 
2009 (1996), as recognized in In re X-P-T, 21 I. & N. Dec. 634 (BIA 1996). 
 58. Id. at 39. The applicant in this case actually applied for asylum, withholding of deportation, 
and voluntary departure. Id. Asylum is a status sought by individuals already in the United States who 
have a well-founded fear of persecution by the government of their native country. Visalaw.com, The 
ABC’s of Immigration—Immigration Terminology, Part I, http://www.visalaw.com/03aug1/ 
2aug103.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2007). Withholding of deportation is similar to asylum. However, 
this form of relief is mandatory for qualified applicants, whereas asylum is discretionary. Relief from 
Deportation, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01939.htm (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2007). Voluntary departure is an alternative to deportation. It allows aliens to return to 
their country of origin and “is preferable to a removal order.” 8 Immigration Basics—Voluntary 
Departure, http://www.immigrationequality.org/manual_template.php?id=1062 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2007). For purposes of this Note, only Chang’s discussion of asylum is relevant. See supra note 20. 
 59. Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 39. The applicant testified “that he was afraid of persecution in 
China; . . . that he and his wife were forced to flee from their commune because . . . [they] did not 
agree to stop having more children . . . [and] that the ‘government’ wanted him to go to a clinic to be 
sterilized.” Id. 
 60. Id. at 48. 
 61. Id. at 43. The BIA based this determination on the fact that the Policy is an effort to provide 
“for . . . [the] vast population in good years and in bad.” Id. While the BIA admitted that the Policy 
could be implemented in more humane ways, it considered China’s overpopulation and concluded that 
implementation of the Policy did not fall within the definition of “persecution” provided in the INA. 
Id. at 44. 
 62. Id. at 44. 
 63. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 601, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA] (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42) (2000)). The statute provides: 
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has been forced to abort a 
pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure to or 
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to facilitate legal entries into the United States.64 Many argue that by 
expanding the statutory definition of “refugee” to include victims of the 
Policy, the U.S. government took a definitive stand against the harsh 
Chinese laws.65 However, the IIRIRA was merely the first step toward 
successfully addressing the needs of Chinese victims—the statute is 
fraught with ambiguity.66 Consequently, judges across jurisdictions have 
struggled to determine which victims successfully qualify for asylum 
eligibility under the IIRIRA.67  
In 1996, the BIA overruled Chang in light of the IIRIRA and extended 
asylum eligibility to those directly victimized by the Policy.68 In re X-P-T 
marked this major turning point in BIA precedent.69 In X-P-T, the IJ found 
that the applicant and her husband violated the Policy, and that the 
applicant’s subsequent sterilization did not afford asylum eligibility for the 
applicant.70 On appeal, the BIA held that the applicant71 was eligible for 
asylum due to the amendments made by section 601 of the IIRIRA.72 
 
 
program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of a political opinion, and a 
person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure 
or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well 
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 
Id. IIRIRA’s more expansive definition of refugee explicitly includes those fleeing the Policy “under 
the rubric of [the protected ground of] political opinion.” Yuan Rong Chen v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 670, 
671–72 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 64. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 65. See Sicard, supra note 29, at 940 (stating that the IIRIRA “resolved the debate” as to whether 
the U.S. government would “take a stand against human rights abuses in China”). 
 66. The statutory terms “other resistance” and “well founded fear” of persecution in the IIRIRA 
have caused much debate in the courts. Compare Ru-Jian Zhang v. Aschroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that impregnating a girlfriend does not constitute “resistance”), with Xu Ming Li v. 
Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1153 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a woman who “announced her opposition 
to government population control policies and [was] thereafter subjected to a forced gynecological 
exam and threatened with future abortion, sterilization of her boyfriend, and arrest” [had] 
demonstrated “other resistance”). See also Ai Feng Yuan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 192, 198 
(2d Cir. 2005) (holding that parents-in-law did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution 
because all of the actions taken against them were efforts to force daughters-in-law to comply with the 
Policy, so it was unlikely they would be persecuted in the future). 
 67. See infra notes 74–84 and accompanying text. 
 68. In re X-P-T, 21 I. & N. Dec. 634 (BIA 1996). For the purposes of this Note, those “directly 
victimized” refers to women subjected to physical procedures or restraint by government officials 
enforcing the Policy. Other victims are those related to the women—such as partners, spouses, and 
family. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. The IJ found that the applicant and her husband violated the Policy by “having three 
children.” As a consequence of this violation, the applicant was forcibly sterilized. Id. at 635. 
 71. It is important to note that X-P-T extends asylum eligibility only to the applicant, rather than 
to both the applicant and her husband. 
 72. Id. at 638 (“[A]s a result of the amendments made by section 601 of IIRIRA, that forcible 
sterilization is a basis for grants of asylum . . . . Section 601 thus supersedes our contrary ruling in 
Matter of Chang.”). For the statutory text of IIRIRA’s section 601, see supra note 63. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/5
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While this case established eligibility of those directly victimized by the 
Policy, it failed to answer the question of whether spouses are eligible for 
asylum.73 
X-P-T left ambiguous the eligibility of indirectly victimized spouses for 
asylum under section 601 of the IIRIRA.74 The BIA addressed this 
lingering question in 1997 in the case In re C-Y-Z.75 The applicant for 
asylum in C-Y-Z claimed he was persecuted in China for his opposition to 
the Policy.76 He stated that after the birth of his family’s third child, his 
wife was forced to undergo sterilization.77 The applicant testified that prior 
to this incident, authorities forced his wife to receive an intrauterine 
device, and after his protests, he was arrested.78 Without giving a detailed 
rationale in its opinion, the majority determined that the applicant had 
established past persecution.79 Due to the combination of this persecution 
and the absence of changed conditions in China, the BIA held that the 
applicant was eligible for asylum.80 While the dissenting opinions argued 
that the majority stance neither furthered legislative intent nor was faithful 
to a narrow interpretation of section 601 of the IIRIRA,81 the majority of 
the BIA did not address these contentions.82 Instead, the majority focused 
 
 
 73. While X-P-T does not overtly deny the husband of the applicant eligibility, it fails to address 
the question. The BIA addresses only the applicant’s victimization and asylum eligibility. It is not 
clear whether the husband also sought asylum. 
 74. See supra note 63. 
 75. In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997). 
 76. Id. at 916. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. In addition to these incidents, the applicant further stated that after the birth of their 
second child his family was fined two thousand yuan, and that he paid this fine to avoid “having his 
house destroyed by birth control cadres.” Id. 
 79. Id. at 918.  
 80. Id. at 919. The BIA stated: “Further, because of the regulatory presumption of a well-founded 
fear of future persecution that arises from a finding of past persecution and the absence of changed 
country conditions . . . the applicant has demonstrated statutory eligibility for asylum . . . .” Id. at 919–
20. 
 While the majority opinion provides little rationale for its decision to extend eligibility to spouses, 
the concurring opinion states that “[i]t is not . . . unusual . . . that the applicant should be granted 
asylum although the harm experienced was not by him, but by a family member.” Id. at 926 
(Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring). The concurring opinion expounds upon this legal trend, 
explaining, “[i]t not only constitutes persecution for the asylum applicant to witness or experience the 
persecution of family members, but it serves to corroborate his or her own fear of persecution.” Id. 
Through these quotations, the concurring opinion demonstrates that there is established precedent for 
the BIA’s decision in C-Y-Z. 
 81. See, e.g., C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 933 (Vacca, Board Member, dissenting) (“If Congress 
had desired to include spouses of individuals who had been forced to undergo involuntary abortion or 
sterilization procedures, they would have done so expressly in the statute.”); see also id. at 935 
(Villageliu, Board Member, dissenting) (“A narrow reading of [IIRIRA’s] section 601(a) does not 
support a grant of asylum to this applicant.”).  
 82. The majority is concerned with the “presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution 
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broadly on the applicant’s established fear of persecution stemming from 
the abusive treatment he received at the hands of Policy enforcers.83 The 
ambiguity of the majority’s ruling has lead to inconsistent circuit court 
rulings as to which applicants are eligible for asylum.84 
E. Circuit Court Disparity Following C-Y-Z  
Due to the deference courts are required to pay to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the INA,85 the ambiguous C-Y-Z ruling is problematic. As 
American courts struggle to confront traditional, yet legally prohibited 
marriages and their place in asylum policy, the lack of rationale provided 
by the BIA in C-Y-Z as to its extension of eligibility to spouses leaves 
judges without direction when determining who is considered a spouse for 
eligibility purposes.86  
1. The Permissive Circuits 
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit addressed the legacy of ambiguity left by the 
BIA’s C-Y-Z decision.87 In Kui Rong Ma v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit 
tackled the complex issue of how to craft asylum eligibility in a practical 
manner, without furthering Policy objectives.88 In Ma, the applicant and 
his partner wanted to marry, but were prohibited from doing so by the 
government due to their ages.89 Consequently, they partook in a traditional 
ceremony.90 Soon after this wedding, the applicant’s wife became 
 
 
that arises from a finding of past persecution and the absence of changed country conditions.” Id. at 
919 (majority opinion). 
 83. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Ai Feng Yuan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2005) (commenting that in 
C-Y-Z the BIA never explained why it adopted its position). 
 85. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ambiguous C-Y-Z 
ruling. 
 87. Kui Rong Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004). For a similar holding, see Xue Yun 
Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that restricting eligibility to legally married 
couples contravenes legislative intent and caters to the coercive provisions of the Policy). 
 88. Ma, 361 F.3d at 560. The Ninth Circuit explained that the conflict in Ma involved a situation 
in which “the early marriage prohibition is inextricably linked to the restrictions on childbirth.” Id. 
 89. Id. at 555. As part of the coercive family planning practices in China, the government has 
established age restrictions on when couples may marry. The events of Ma occurred under the New 
Marriage Law, so the applicant could not enter into a legally recognized union until age twenty-two, 
and his partner could not legally marry until she was twenty. When the events of the case commenced, 
the applicant was nineteen, and his partner was twenty-one. Id. 
 90. Id. A traditional Chinese wedding ceremony often serves as a proxy for legal union for 
couples who are prohibited from marrying by the New Marriage Law. See Xiao Lan Zheng v. 
Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 993, 995 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[The couple in that case was] one year shy of the legal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss6/5
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pregnant.91 When the authorities learned this, they forcibly aborted the 
pregnancy and fined the couple.92 While the BIA rule stated only that 
“legally” married spouses were eligible for asylum,93 the Ninth Circuit 
held that this limited eligibility actually furthered Policy objectives.94 The 
court reasoned that basing eligibility on the Chinese government’s 
determination of “legality” would legitimize and support its coercive 
laws.95 Consequently, the court chose to expand asylum eligibility for 
Chinese nationals fleeing the Policy in an effort to combat the effects of its 
harsh laws.96 The Ninth Circuit also advocated the extension of eligibility 
to applicants whose marriages were not legally recognized at the time of 
application.97 However, the court did not actually extend eligibility to such 
an individual because the applicant’s marriage in Ma was legally 
recognized by China at the time of the ruling.98 
The Ninth Circuit cemented Ma’s extension of C-Y-Z in Xiao Lan 
Zheng v. Ashcroft.99 In Zheng, the court heard the case of an asylum 
applicant, who, like the applicant in Ma, partook in only a traditional 
wedding ceremony.100 The couple was not only penalized for this 
transgression at the time of their original union, but they were further 
 
 
age for marriage. They had a small, traditional Chinese wedding ceremony.”); see also Rui-Jian Zhang 
v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531, 532 (5th cir. 2004) (commenting that the couple at issue was neither legally 
married nor married in a traditional ceremony, and this distinguished the case from Ma).  
 91. Ma, 361 F.3d at 555. 
 92. Id. The court further explained that the pregnancy was in its third trimester at the time of the 
abortion. Id. 
 93. Id. at 557. The BIA stated that “[it] decline[d] to extend [C-Y-Z] protection to legally 
unmarried partners.” Id. 
 94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 95. Ma, 361 F.3d at 559 (“[T]he prohibition against underage marriage is ‘an integral part’ of 
China’s coercive population control program.” (quoting Xu Ming Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1160 
n.5 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc))).  
 96. Id. at 561.  
 97. The Ninth Circuit stated that in light of Congress’s purpose “to give relief to victims of 
China’s oppressive population control policy,” eligibility should be extended to “husbands whose 
marriages would be legally recognized, but for China’s [Policy].” Id. 
 98. The Third Circuit noted that the seemingly groundbreaking nature of the Ma ruling is 
potentially undercut by the fact that the couple’s marriage was legally recognized by the Chinese 
government at the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. As 
the Ma court noted “the Chinese government had recently issued a certificate recognizing [Ma’s] 
marriage as a ‘de facto’ marriage.” Ma, 361 F.4d at 557. Thus, the court did not actually grant 
eligibility to a traditionally married applicant. While the Ninth Circuit held that “eligibility for asylum 
may not be denied . . . [because China refuses to grant official recognition to marriages],” it did not 
grant eligibility to such an individual. Id. at 559. 
 99. 382 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 100. See supra notes 89–90. In this case, the couple had a traditional ceremony and did not even 
attempt to apply for a marriage certificate due to the New Marriage Law. Zheng, 382 F.3d at 995. 
Their lack of marriage certificate, and their consequential lack of authorization to have a child, caused 
the couple to be fined heavily after the birth of their daughter. Id. 
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penalized years later after having reached the legal age of marriage.101 The 
court examined the situation and found that, according to Ma,102 the 
applicant in Zheng was also eligible for asylum.103 The Ninth Circuit 
found eligibility104 because the couple could in no way have complied 
with the Policy due to the government’s actions.105 This decision marks 
the actual application of the court’s sentiment in Ma.  
In January 2006, the Seventh Circuit employed the Ninth Circuit’s 
rationale and held that denying asylum solely based on the lack of a 
legally sanctioned marriage improperly furthered Policy objectives.106 In 
Junshao Zhang v. Gonzales, a male asylum applicant claimed that he 
participated in a traditional marriage in China when he was under the 
legally prescribed age for marriage.107 He claimed that after his wife 
became pregnant, she was forced to have an abortion after the government 
learned of their illegal acts.108 On these facts, the Seventh Circuit held that 
to deny asylum simply because the applicant was not a legal spouse was to 
“subvert the [IIRIRA amendment to the INA].”109 Accordingly, the court 
 
 
 101. Id. at 1002 (“[When the couple] reached the legal age, the local officials refused to issue 
them a marriage certificate because they had not paid their fines, which penalized [them] for getting 
married early and for having unauthorized children.”).  
 102. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text for a summary of the Ninth Circuit’s rationale 
in Ma. 
 103. Zheng, 382 F.3d at 1002. The court cited Ma’s discussion of China’s harsh laws regarding 
age of marriage and explained why granting asylum eligibility only to legally married couples catered 
to Policy objectives. Id. The Ninth Circuit then held that Zheng was “therefore eligible for asylum 
because of the forced abortion of his child even though China does not recognize his marriage.” Id.  
 104. In Zheng, the Ninth Circuit found that the applicant was eligible for asylum, but remanded 
“to the BIA to exercise its discretion whether to grant Zheng asylum.” Id. It bears repeating that there 
is a difference between being granted asylum and being found eligible for asylum. After a 
determination of eligibility, the grant of asylum is at the discretion of the IJ. See Rodriguez-Matamoros 
v. INS, 86 F.3d 158 (9th Cir. 1996).  
 105. Zheng, 382 F.3d at 1002. The Chinese government refused to issue the couple a marriage 
certificate even after they reached the legal age. Id.  
 106. Junshao Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 107. Id. at 995. 
 108. Id. The applicant also claimed that his wife was detained by the Chinese government for two 
days and that he was forced to pay a fine as a penalty for the couple’s acts. Id. 
 109. Id. at 999 (citing Kui Rong Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558–61 (9th Cir. 2004)). The 
Seventh Circuit stated: 
Congress passed § 601(a)(1) of . . . IIRIRA to ensure that families who are victims of forced 
abortion and sterilization under China’s population control policy would receive asylum, yet 
the IJ denied the claim precisely because that population control policy rendered the marriage 
illegal. That would entirely subvert the Congressional amendment, and deny asylum to 
anyone whose sterilization or abortion was set in motion by a decision to marry and procreate 
prior to the minimum age. Where a traditional marriage ceremony has taken place, but is not 
recognized by the Chinese government because of the age restrictions in the population 
control measures, that person nevertheless qualifies as a spouse for purposes of asylum. 
Id. 
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found Zhang to be eligible for asylum, and remanded the issue to the 
Attorney General so that he could exercise his discretion about whether to 
grant asylum.110 
2. The Restrictive Circuits 
The Third Circuit applied a more restrictive rationale in Cai Luan Chen 
v. Ashcroft.111 This case involved an applicant whose fiancée became 
pregnant.112 Upon learning of the pregnancy, officials ordered an 
abortion.113 When the couple did not immediately respond, officials 
attacked the applicant.114 Eventually, the applicant fled to the United 
States, and his fiancée was forced to undergo an abortion in her eighth 
month of pregnancy.115 The applicant sought asylum in light of the C-Y-Z 
opinion, asserting that he would have been married but for the Policy.116 
The Third Circuit rejected this argument, strictly limiting C-Y-Z to all 
legally married partners.117 The court acknowledged that this decision was 
in tension with Ma, but distinguished the two cases by stating that Ma 
never directly addressed whether C-Y-Z may be extended to those 
applicants whom the Chinese government refuses to legally acknowledge 
as spouses, and that Ma did not apply to “unmarried persons.”118 The court 
 
 
 110. Zhang, 434 F.3d at 1002. For a discussion of the procedure surrounding the grant or denial of 
asylum, see supra notes 44–54 and accompanying text. 
 Since the rendering of its Zhang decision, the Seventh Circuit has expressly aligned itself with the 
Ninth Circuit, stating: “[W]e have joined the Ninth Circuit in extending protection to spouses in cases 
‘where a traditional marriage ceremony has taken place, but is not recognized by the Chinese 
government because of the age restrictions in the [Policy].’” Yuan Rong Chen v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 
670, 674 (7th Cir. 2006). While extending asylum eligibility to traditionally married couples, however, 
the Seventh Circuit in Chen declined to extend eligibility to boyfriends. Id. 
 111. 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that refusing to extend eligibility to “unmarried 
partners is reasonable”). 
 112. Id. at 223. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (officials “[hit] him with sticks”).  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 222. The applicant stated that he was never married due to “China’s inflated minimum 
marriage age requirement.” Id.  
 117. Id. at 229 (stating that this limitation would “[promote] administrability and verifiability”). 
The court also discussed the ambiguity and consequential difficulty of accurately applying C-Y-Z, 
stating that two possible rationales for the decision might be: 1) a forced abortion or sterilization of 
one spouse might cause “sympathetic suffering” for the other, constituting persecution; or 2) a forced 
abortion or sterilization of one spouse might adversely impact the couple’s ability to functionally raise 
a family. Id. at 225–26.  
 118. Id. at 231–32. The court pointed out that by the time the Ninth Circuit ruled in Ma, Ma’s 
marriage was legally recognized by the Chinese government. Id. Moreover, the court commended that 
“Ma’s express holding applies only to putative husbands and not unmarried partners.” Id. at 232. For a 
discussion of the scope of Ma’s ruling, see supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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further distinguished the Zheng opinion from Ma by disagreeing with the 
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the legislative intent surrounding the 
IIRIRA.119 By distinguishing Ma and disagreeing with Zheng, the Third 
Circuit’s rationale suggests that it read the BIA’s ambiguous C-Y-Z 
decision as a narrow one that should be applied in limited 
circumstances.120 
The Fifth Circuit applied the Chen rationale in Ru-Jian Zhang v. 
Ashcroft, and denied asylum eligibility to an unmarried applicant.121 Like 
the Chen court, the Fifth Circuit distinguished the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of C-Y-Z.122 Unlike Ma and Zheng, the Zhang case did not 
involve a married couple—either legally or culturally.123 Thus, while the 
court was able to distinguish these cases, it had no occasion to critically 
analyze them.124 In Zhang, the applicant was unmarried, but his pregnant, 
live-in girlfriend was directly victimized under the Policy.125 In light of its 
interpretation of C-Y-Z, the court upheld the BIA’s decision to deny the 
application.126  
 
 
 It is important to note that this distinction drawn by the Chen court is rendered irrelevant by the 
Ninth Circuit’s subsequent Zheng opinion. While Chen was decided on August 20, 2004, Zheng, 
decided on September 2, 2004, granted asylum eligibility to the male member of a couple that was 
only traditionally married. Xiao Lan Zheng v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 2004). After 
finding the applicant eligible, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the BIA so that it could “exercise 
its discretion whether to grant Zheng asylum.” Id.; see also supra notes 97–105. 
 119. Chen, 381 F.3d at 231–32. The court stated that limiting C-Y-Z to married couples does not 
necessarily contravene Congress’s policies. Id. The court developed this idea by noting that some 
legislators “had reservations about the ease with which ‘young Chinese single-unmarried-males’ might 
falsely claim eligibility for asylum under the proposed amendment.” Id. at 233 (citing 142 Cong. Rec. 
S4593 (daily ed. May 2, 1996)). 
 120. See, e.g., Yong Zhen Chen v. Ashcroft, 106 Fed. App’x 129, 131 (3d Cir. 2004) (refusing to 
apply C-Y-Z to an unmarried applicant because the “BIA does not urge . . . otherwise” and statutory 
interpretation of who constitutes a “refugee” under IIRIRA requires “an individualized analysis of the 
alleged persecution”).  
 121. Ri-Jian Zhang v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2004). The facts of this case are scant. The 
Fifth Circuit merely stated that the applicant was an unmarried male whose “live-in” girlfriend 
remained in China. The court explained that the applicant’s girlfriend was “a Chinese national living in 
China” and “was fined and forced to have an abortion pursuant to China’s population control 
program.” Id. at 532. In the initial hearing, the BIA denied the applicant’s asylum eligibility, citing 
C-Y-Z. Id. In the appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision due to the fact that “Zhang, 
lacking spousal status, exhibited no legally cognizable ‘resistance’ to China’s population control 
program.” Id. The court further stated that “merely impregnating one’s girlfriend” did not constitute 
“resistance”. Id. 
 122. Id.; see also supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 123. Zhang, 395 F.3d at 532. The court indicated that there was no “informal” marriage. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  
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3. The Second Circuit’s Reservation of Judgment 
The Second Circuit recently acknowledged the ambiguous legacy of 
C-Y-Z, refusing to rule on the question of which Chinese family members 
were eligible for asylum.127 In Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Department of 
Justice,128 this circuit simultaneously considered three cases in which 
asylum applications had been rejected by IJs.129 In each of the three cases, 
the petitioners were not legally married to their partners, and the IJs relied 
upon similar rationales in each to deny eligibility.130 After the BIA 
affirmed the IJs’ opinions in each of the cases, the Second Circuit 
reviewed these decisions and dismissed them due to the unclear status of 
unmarried individuals in light of C-Y-Z.131 
4. Circuit Positions on the Eligibility of Other Family Members 
While the Second Circuit has refused to rule on the eligibility of 
unmarried partners, it has ruled on cases involving parents and parents-in-
law of those directly victimized under the Policy.132 The opinion of Ai 
Feng Yuan v. U.S. Department of Justice suggests that, absent BIA 
opinions to the contrary, the Second Circuit might grant eligibility to 
unmarried partners. In this case, the court denied eligibility to all parents 
and parents-in-law of Policy victims.133 The applicants in Yuan were the 
parents-in-law of two women persecuted under the Policy.134 One woman 
 
 
 127. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 128. Id.  
 129. In both Lin’s and Zou’s cases, the IJ rejected claims stemming from the persecution of their 
girlfriends. Id. at 188. The IJs relied on the 1000-person cap on asylees under section 601(a) of IIRIRA 
(which was in existence at the time), and on the absence of marriage. Id. In petitioner Dong’s case, the 
IJ rejected a claim based from the persecution of his fiancée. Id. The IJ reasoned that C-Y-Z has not 
been extended beyond spouses of those persecuted. Id. at 189. 
 130. The IJs in each case explicitly cited C-Y-Z. Id. at 188–89. While the IJ in Lin’s case relied on 
the 1000-person cap argument, he also stated that it would not be “appropriate to expand [C-Y-Z] to 
unmarried couples.” Id. at 188. The IJ in Zou’s case cited C-Y-Z but relied upon the unmarried status 
of Zou and his girlfriend. Id. In Dong’s case, the IJ relied exclusively on C-Y-Z and the BIA’s failure 
to extend it to individuals other than legal spouses. Id. at 189. 
 131. The Lin court stated: 
Of course, it may be the case that permissible distinctions can be drawn between spousal 
eligibility, on the one hand, and boyfriend and fiancé eligibility, on the other. It may also be 
the case, however, that the rationale for spousal eligibility applies with equal logic and force 
to the eligibility of boyfriends and fiancés. Until the BIA has clarified why it established 
spousal eligibility in the first instance, we cannot know. 
Id. at 192.  
 132. See, e.g., Ai Feng Yuan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 133. Id. at 198. 
 134. Id. at 194. 
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was forced to receive an intrauterine device, while the other was forced to 
undergo an abortion.135 Although the applicants were not directly 
victimized, the resistance of their relatives affected them dramatically, as 
the authorities harassed their relatives to induce their compliance.136 Under 
these facts, and in light of the relevant statutory language, the court 
determined that parents and parents-in-law are not eligible for asylum.137 
However, the court emphasized the fundamental right to procreate shared 
by spouses.138 As both traditionally and legally married couples have the 
ability to procreate, perhaps the Second Circuit suggested a willingness to 
align with the more permissive circuits. 
Other circuits have addressed the eligibility of children of Policy 
victims.139 These circuits typically refuse to impute a parent’s eligibility 
for suffering persecution under the Policy to children, and consequently 
deny children asylum eligibility.140  
5. Status of Other Circuits 
Whereas the Ninth, Seventh, Fifth, and Third Circuits have all 
definitively ruled on the question of how far to extend asylum eligibility 
for traditionally married couples,141 and the Second Circuit has deferred to 
the BIA to ameliorate the ambiguity surrounding the issue,142 the other 
 
 
 135. Id. These types of persecution are typical methods of enforcing the Policy. See also supra 
notes 77–78, 108, 115 and accompanying text. 
 136. Yuan, 416 F.3d at 194. The court described this harassment: “Not finding [the daughter-in-
law], [the authorities] broke the furniture in petitioners’ house and threatened to arrest [the husband]. 
Later . . . [he] was fired from his state job . . . .” Id. The Second Circuit also explained the harassment 
of the female petitioner: “[She] was detained . . . and [was] only released when the daughter-in-law 
reported for her checkup. [She] was again detained . . . [and] was not released until the daughter-in-law 
reported to the family planning officials.” Id. at 195. The female petitioner testified that she had been 
beaten, but this was not supported by reliable evidence. Id. n.2. 
 137. Id. at 198. The court examined the IIRIRA and stated that its plain language indicates that 
individuals other than direct victims are not eligible for asylum. Id. at 196. However, the court 
simultaneously recognized that the BIA extended eligibility to legal spouses. Id. In order to justify this 
interpretation of the statute, the Second Circuit stated that the right to procreate is shared by both 
spouses. Id. at 197. However, the persecution of a child or a child’s spouse does not hinder this 
fundamental right to procreate. Id.  
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Yu Gao v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 167 Fed. App’x 313, 316 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that 
applicant herself must have experienced persecution to be eligible for asylum); Jiu Shu Wang v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 152 Fed. App’x 761, 769 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that there is no authority imputing 
refugee status stemming from a forced abortion or sterilization procedure from an eligible mother to a 
child). 
 140. See, e.g., Wang, 152 Fed. App’x at 770–71; Gao, 167 Fed. App’x 313. 
 141. See supra notes 87–126 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
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circuits have yet to address this question.143 While the First Circuit 
remains neutral,144 the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have yet 
to comment on this issue at all.145 
This brief synopsis of judicial opinions on the asylum eligibility of 
Chinese nationals fleeing the Policy reveals deep philosophical divisions 
among the circuits, and these divisions hinder legislative goals.146 As a 
result of this conflict, jurisdictions struggle with how to incorporate the 
notion of the traditional Chinese marriage into asylum policy.147 
III. ANALYSIS 
While the law surrounding asylum eligibility for those fleeing the 
Policy is difficult to discern, there are a few universally held rules relating 
to the issue.148 Direct victims of the Policy are always granted eligibility 
for asylum.149 Legally acknowledged spouses of direct victims are also 
always granted eligibility.150 Boyfriends and girlfriends have never been 
granted asylum eligibility.151 
 
 
 143. See, e.g., Xue Xiang Chen v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 110, 111 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating that 
“[t]here is an active circuit split” on what family relationship is sufficient to render an individual 
eligible for asylum and that “[the circuit acknowledges] but [does] not weigh in on the question [of 
whether or not it is irrational for the BIA to permit spouses to apply for asylum, but not boyfriends or 
girlfriends]”).  
 144. See supra note 143. 
 145. The Eleventh Circuit has commented on this issue, but has yet to take a definitive position. 
See, e.g., Wang, 152 Fed. App’x at 767–69 (acknowledging that in light of C-Y-Z the “forced abortion 
or sterilization of a wife can be imputed to her husband,” differentiating between spouses and “live-in 
girlfriend[s],” and distinguishing Ma due to the fact that Wang and his girlfriend were “not married, 
[either] officially or unofficially”). 
 146. See Kui Rong Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 560 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Perales v. Casillas, 
903 F.2d 1043, 1051 (5th Cir. 1990) (“one of Congress’s reasons for enacting the visa preference 
provisions is family unification”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 1 (1996) (listing as the goals of 
IIRIRA: “to reform the legal immigration system and facilitate legal entries into the United States”). 
These sources suggest that the vague state of current immigration law for those fleeing the Policy 
directly prevents these legislative goals from coming to fruition. By inconsistently granting and 
denying eligibility, circuit courts neither enable entry into the United States nor promote family 
unification. A uniform stance on which applicants are granted eligibility for asylum would enable 
Chinese citizens to make an informed decision about whether or not to apply for asylum. If applicants 
have family unification as a primary goal, knowing whether or not their entire family would be 
considered eligible would dictate their course of action. A consistent stance would also free the courts 
from addressing futile claims of eligibility.  
 147. See, e.g., supra note 143. 
 148. See generally infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.  
 149. This rule was achieved by the 1996 enactment of IIRIRA. See generally supra note 63 and 
accompanying text. 
 150. This was established by In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997). See generally supra 
notes 75–84 and accompanying text. Although the ruling in this case is ambiguous as to how far this 
eligibility extends, circuits agree that it undoubtedly grants legally married couples per se eligibility. 
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With these established principles in mind, this area of law is seemingly 
straightforward. However, the unsettled nature of asylum eligibility for 
those fleeing the Policy lies in the status of couples who are only 
traditionally married.152 While some circuit court decisions push for the 
eligibility of all married couples—whether they are married legally or 
traditionally153—others limit C-Y-Z to legally married couples.154 The 
ambiguous C-Y-Z ruling leaves circuit courts without a clear idea of 
whether traditionally married individuals should qualify for asylum 
eligibility.155 These questions in turn lead to confusion over the status of 
boyfriends,156 girlfriends, and other family members.157 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits are the most lenient in this area of 
law—they support the idea that traditionally married couples should be 
granted asylum eligibility.158 While the Ninth Circuit was initially 
criticized for failing to act on this liberal sentiment, it recently relied on 
this idea to provide asylum eligibility in Zheng.159 The Ninth Circuit’s 
groundbreaking rulings in this area of law inspired the Seventh Circuit to 
adopt its rationale.160 Perhaps other circuits will follow suit and find 
traditionally married applicants eligible for asylum. 
If the Seventh and Ninth Circuits are on one end of the asylum 
eligibility spectrum, the Third and Fifth Circuits lie at the opposite 
extreme.161 These jurisdictions employ a restrictive approach to asylum 
 
 
See, e.g., Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the BIA 
interpreted IIRIRA to establish eligibility of the “spouse of a person who was forced to undergo an 
abortion or sterilization”). 
 151. See Chen, 381 F.3d at 223 (citing the BIA’s statement that C-Y-Z has never been extended to 
“unmarried partners”). In Lin, the Second Circuit remanded three cases involving unmarried (either 
legally or traditionally) couples to the BIA due to C-Y-Z’s ambiguity, suggesting that these individuals 
could potentially be granted eligibility in the future. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 
184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 152. Compare Kui Rong Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004) (leaving the possibility 
open that traditionally married couples could be eligible for asylum), with Chen, 381 F.3d 221 
(definitively limiting C-Y-Z to legally married couples). 
 153. See supra notes 87–110 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 111–26 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. The Lin court addressed the issue of the 
status of boyfriends and fiancés of direct victims of the Policy. Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
416 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 157. See supra notes 132–40 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit expressed this idea in both 
Ma and Zheng. 
 159. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Jinshao Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999–1001 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 161. See supra notes 111–26 and accompanying text. 
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eligibility.162 They interpret C-Y-Z’s ambiguity strictly to include only 
legally married couples,163 and have not extended eligibility to 
traditionally married couples, dating couples, and other family 
members.164 
The juxtaposition of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ rationale with that 
of the Third and Fifth Circuits’ approach reveals two different policy 
choices regarding immigration law.165 While the expansive approach of 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits seems to favor accommodating victimized 
Chinese nationals at any cost,166 the more limited rationales of the Third 
and Fifth Circuits seem to be more concerned with the practicality of 
allowing increased numbers of individuals into the United States.167 Their 
restrictive approaches are certainly more practical, but they pose the risk 
of failing to grant asylum eligibility to legitimate Policy victims. 
In between the two views of granting asylum eligibility for traditionally 
married spouses, and restricting it to legally married spouses, there lies a 
vast expanse of muddled law and confused, undecided circuits.168 While 
some circuits have yet to address the extent to which asylum eligibility is 
available for traditional spouses of direct Policy victims,169 some await a 
BIA clarification of the C-Y-Z ruling,170 and others have stated their 
opinions on the subject in dicta.171 
The international effects of this ambiguity in American law renders 
clarification imperative.172 Where does the notion of the “traditional 
marriage” fit into our jurisprudence? The various jurisdictional approaches 
reveal inconsistent policy choices.173 Because asylum eligibility for Policy 
 
 
 162. See supra notes 111–26 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra notes 111–26 and accompanying text. 
 164. Both the Fifth and Third Circuits are careful to distinguish their cases from those of the Ninth 
Circuit. The opinions of cases such as Chen and Zhang clearly reveal their criticisms of the Ninth 
Circuit’s expansive view of asylum eligibility. See, e.g., supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text. 
 165. For a summary of these circuits’ approaches, see generally supra notes 87–126 and 
accompanying text. 
 166. See generally supra notes 87–110 and accompanying text. 
 167. See generally supra notes 111–26 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 127–31, 142–45 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra note 145. 
 172. By granting Policy victims asylum eligibility, the United States firmly demonstrated its 
disapproval of the coercive Chinese laws. See Sicard, supra note 29. If the judicial ambiguity is not 
resolved, Policy victims will be unable to seek respite in the United States, and the IIRIRA will 
amount to nothing more than ineffective, half-hearted opposition to the Policy.  
 173. The inconsistent policy choices involve the difference between international and domestic 
priorities. As discussed in the text, the Ninth Circuit’s desire to expand asylum eligibility addresses the 
international plight of Policy victims by enabling more victims to enter the United States. Conversely, 
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victims is an international issue, it is essential for the United States to take 
a strong and clear position in order to send a message to both China and 
other nations about its stance on the Policy. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
The disparate criteria used to assess the asylum eligibility of Chinese 
nationals fleeing the Policy must be standardized across the country.174 
The application of statutory principles must be unified. This Note proposes 
a set of rules and factors that should be applied in every jurisdiction in 
order to facilitate the process of determining asylum eligibility.175 
Homogenizing the rules to make applicants of comparable relation 
uniformly eligible will remove burdens from both courts and applicants. 
Uniform rules will also successfully address how courts should 
incorporate the notion of the traditional Chinese marriage into the 
American jurisprudential tradition. Furthermore, a standard set of rules 
will clear courts of frivolous and less extreme applicant claims,176 increase 
the speed with which decisions are made, and enable applicants to better 
plan their actions in order to keep their families together.177 
 
 
the Third and Fifth Circuits strive to exclude all partners except legal spouses. This policy of limitation 
affords less aid to Chinese nationals, but is arguably more practical for domestic reasons. By 
restricting grants of asylum eligibility, the Third and Fifth Circuits prevent an economically 
unmanageable number of refugees from entering the United States. However, it is important to 
consider that the more restrictive the policy regarding asylum eligibility is, the more potentially 
legitimate claims may be overlooked.  
 174. See, e.g., supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text. These notes illustrate the confusing 
and inconsistent state of current law. While the Third and Fifth Circuits employ a restrictive 
interpretation of the BIA’s vague C-Y-Z opinion in order to deny asylum eligibility to all legally 
unmarried applicants, the Ninth and Seventh Circuits extend C-Y-Z to couples who are traditionally 
married. The confusion is heightened by examining other jurisdictions. See supra notes 141–47 and 
accompanying text; see also Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Thus, the legacy of ambiguity left by C-Y-Z not only perpetuates a circuit split, it leads some 
jurisdictions to refrain from addressing this pivotal issue entirely. Lin, 416 F.3d at 192. In light of this 
uncertainty, the Second Circuit has recently taken an affirmative step to clarify the C-Y-Z rationale by 
remanding three cases to the BIA for a more detailed explanation of the case. Id.; see also Zhou Yun 
Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 87 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that “the BIA . . . leaves us guessing at its 
reasoning” and “remand is required because the finding was not adequately explained”).  
 175. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra note 119. Legislators have previously expressed concern over falsified claims of 
asylum eligibility by single males. Lawmakers also demonstrated their desire to apply section 601 of 
IIRIRA only to the most extreme forms of persecution for resistance to “coercive population control 
program[s].” Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 142 CONG. REC. 
H2634 (daily ed. May 2, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith)). The legislators expressing this view 
suggest that expanding eligibility would open courts up to comparably minor claims of persecution. Id. 
 177. Consider Zheng, in which the applicant left his partner in China while traveling to the United 
States to seek asylum. Xiao Lan Zheng v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 2004). If a procedure 
is standardized so that potential eligibility (or lack thereof) is apparent, future applicants will only 
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Legally married couples should retain their asylum eligibility,178 and 
couples that are neither legally nor traditionally married should not be 
eligible for asylum.179 Those who claim to be traditionally married 
couples—those couples who have pledged themselves in contravention of 
Policy oppression—should be eligible for asylum only after courts weigh a 
variety of factors.180 These factors, or the “Factor Test,” are: (1) whether 
or not the couple has children; (2) the age of the applicants; (3) sworn 
testimony demonstrating that a traditional ceremony occurred; (4) the 
presence of any government documentation restricting the couple from 
legally marrying or levying penalties upon them for Policy violations; and 
(5) any other relevant concerns.181 
A. Arguments for Legally Married Couple Eligibility 
Because the matter is well settled, the asylum eligibility of legally 
married couples does not require extensive discussion.182 Due to the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s position that past persecution of 
one spouse can be established by the forced abortion or sterilization of 
another spouse,183 the absence of changed circumstances in China,184 and 
the BIA’s clear decision on the issue, circuits now uniformly grant 
eligibility to legally married couples.185 
 
 
attempt entry if they honestly believe they might be found eligible. If they do not believe that they will 
be eligible for asylum in the United States, they will either stay in China, or attempt entry into another 
country, thus eliminating the need to leave families behind to live under the Policy. 
 178. The eligibility of legally married couples is a settled matter in all jurisdictions. C-Y-Z decided 
this question. See supra notes 74–84, 150 and accompanying text. 
 179. For an elaboration of this argument, see infra notes 186–88 and accompanying text. 
 180. See infra note 181 and accompanying text. It is important to note that this test (the “Factor 
Test”) will determine who, for purposes of asylum eligibility, has been “traditionally married.” It does 
not purport to distinguish some traditionally married couples from others. 
 181. Admittedly, the vast variation in the Policy’s application across China, and the remote 
geographical location of many witnesses, will make fulfilling each of these factors difficult. This 
explains the factor-based nature of the inquiry. Under the Factor Test, courts can flexibly consider the 
totality of the circumstances in each couple’s case before making a determination of asylum eligibility. 
For a discussion of the diverse manner in which the Policy is applied throughout China, see supra 
notes 37–39 and accompanying text. 
 182. See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
 183. In re C-Y-Z, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (BIA 1997). The BIA cites the INS brief for the 
admission that “[i]ts legal perspective . . . is that the husband of a sterilized wife can essentially stand 
in her shoes and make a bona fide . . . application for asylum based on problems impacting more 
intimately on her than on him.” Id. 
 184. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 185. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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B. Arguments for Excluding Non-Married Couples from Eligibility 
Although the exclusion of all nonmarried couples from asylum 
eligibility initially seems harsh, it is necessary to accommodate legitimate 
concerns expressed by Congress.186 First, the restriction of eligibility to 
married couples would help to prevent those with falsified claims from 
being granted asylum.187 By requiring formal commitment as a 
prerequisite for asylum eligibility, the United States will help to ensure 
that only individuals with close connections to direct Policy victims are 
considered eligible for asylum. Second, and for similar reasons, this 
restriction on eligibility limits applications to victims of the most severe 
forms of persecution.188 By requiring a close connection between 
applicants and their significant others, American courts can self-select 
adjudicated claims. The connection demonstrated by a marriage (either 
legal or traditional) ensures that the asylum applicant and the direct Policy 
victim have a close connection, and that their separation would cause 
much strife. By limiting the asylum applicant pool to the most desperate 
applicants, case loads will be reduced and these most pressing claims can 
be heard in a relatively expedient manner. 
C. Arguments for the Use of the Factor Test in Evaluating Traditionally 
Married Couple Eligibility 
The Factor Test for evaluating the eligibility of those who claim to be 
traditionally married couples represents the best compromise between the 
competing policy concerns of the disjointed circuit courts. Restricting 
asylum eligibility to legally married couples would be akin to allowing 
China’s restrictive Policy to define American courts’ understanding of 
“family.”189 Honoring the Chinese government’s restrictive notion of 
 
 
 186. See supra notes 119, 176.  
 187. See supra notes 119, 176 and accompanying text.  
 188. See supra notes 119, 176 and accompanying text. Legislators who express concern over 
fraudulent claims of asylum eligibility also suggest that expanding eligibility would open courts up to 
comparably minor claims of persecution.  
 189. In Ma, the Ninth Circuit described the effects of allowing the Chinese government to define 
the notion of “family”: 
Only by adopting the BIA’s rule restricting relief to legally registered spouses would we 
create the harsh and arbitrary result that the government decries . . . namely breaking apart a 
family. If . . . Ma’s wife . . . applied for asylum, she would be automatically eligible based on 
her forced abortion. Yet, under the BIA’s rule, Ma’s husband would not be eligible because 
under China’s population control program their marriage was “underage” and could not be 
“legally registered.” [This would cause] . . . the break-up of a family, a result that is at odds 
. . . with significant parts of our immigration policy. 
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family could lead to the division of functional and happy family units—
units that are illegal in China due to the coercive Policy.190 Predicating the 
notion of family on an arbitrary age set forth by a coercive law is to give 
effect to this law and its harsh effects. 
Conversely, uniformly granting asylum eligibility to all legally 
unmarried couples ignores the substantial dangers of both fraudulent 
claims and an impractically excessive number of immigrants entering the 
United States.191 While ideally no dishonest applicants would be found 
eligible for asylum, it is necessary to carefully distinguish between 
unmarried couples and traditionally married couples. A failure to do so 
could lead to falsified claims of asylum eligibility. Excluding false claims 
is also necessary in order to prevent the entry of an unmanageable number 
of immigrants into the United States.192 
The Factor Test represents the best compromise of these competing 
policy concerns.193 By granting some traditionally married couples, but not 
all, asylum eligibility, the Factor Test simultaneously decreases the 
number of false claims, helps keep refugee numbers manageable, and 
honors the pressing claims of traditionally married couples. 
Under the Factor Test, judges would be required to evaluate: (1) 
whether or not the applying couple has children; (2) the age of the 
applicants; (3) sworn testimony demonstrating that a traditional marriage 
ceremony occurred; (4) the presence of any government documentation 
restricting the couple from legally marrying or levying penalties upon 
them for Policy violations; and (5) any other relevant concerns. Applicants 
would not be forced to fulfill each of these criteria.194 Rather, the Factor 
Test allows judges to evaluate the totality of the circumstances with 
respect to each applicant and provides guidelines as to what facts indicate 
both the incidence of a traditional marriage and either past persecution or a 
well-founded fear of future persecution.195 Each of the proposed factors 
examines the depth of couples’ commitment to each other and the 
likelihood of persecution (both past and future).196 Further, the flexibility 
 
 
Kui Rong Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See supra notes 119, 176, and 186.  
 192. See supra note 173. 
 193. For a summary of these competing policy concerns, see supra notes 158–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 194. For a discussion of the difficulties of placing such a high evidentiary burden on applicants, 
see supra note 181. 
 195. For a discussion of these and other requirements of asylum eligibility, see supra notes 44–54 
and accompanying text. 
 196. The first and second factors, the presence of children and the ages of the couple, bear on 
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of the factors, and the wide leverage afforded to judges, acknowledges the 
difficulty of applying rigid standards to an area of law confronted by 
myriad applicants with myriad pasts.197 
The Factor Test’s flexible approach and its focus on identifying 
traditionally married couples with legitimate eligibility claims ensures that 
valid policy concerns will be addressed. Furthermore, it allows judges to 
adequately examine each applicant’s situation before rendering a decision.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Since the implementation of the Policy, many Chinese nationals have 
attempted to flee to the United States.198 In light of an ambiguous ruling 
by the BIA,199 circuits have struggled to determine exactly which Chinese 
nationals are eligible for asylum.200 Today, the applicable law is vague and 
difficult to discern.  
This Note proposes rules and factors that allow courts to consistently 
determine whether applicants are eligible for asylum.201 By granting all 
legally married couples eligibility,202 denying all non-married couples 
eligibility,203 and employing the Factor Test in determining traditionally 
married couple eligibility,204 this Note’s proposal will meet the needs of 
 
 
whether the couple defied Policy mandates. If the ages of the children and the ages of the applicants 
demonstrate that the couple was below the legally prescribed age of marriage under the New Marriage 
Law when their children were born, this proves Policy defiance and the likelihood of persecution. 
Furthermore, the first factor, the presence of children, helps to indicate the depth of a couple’s 
commitment. The third factor, sworn testimony regarding a traditional marriage, is included to 
demonstrate the extent of a couple’s commitment. The fourth factor, whether or not there is 
documentation regarding Policy defiance and penalties, helps judges evaluate the extent of past 
persecution and the likelihood of future persecution. The fifth factor, which calls for judges to examine 
“any other relevant concerns,” acknowledges the vast variety of applicant situations, and allows judges 
to particularize their inquiry based upon the histories of specific applicants.  
 197. The pasts of applicants are myriad in part because the Policy is not applied uniformly across 
China. See, e.g., supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra note 5.  
 199. For discussions of the C-Y-Z decision and the legacy of its ambiguity, see supra notes 75–84 
and accompanying text. This case is deemed ambiguous because the BIA never adequately explained 
its rationale for extending asylum eligibility to spouses of those persecuted under the Policy. See Shi 
Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Thus, because the BIA has 
never adequately explained its rationale for establishing spousal eligibility under IIRIRA § 601(a) . . . 
it may be the case that permissible distinctions can be drawn between spousal eligibility . . . and 
boyfriend and fiancé eligibility . . . . It may also be the case . . . that the rationale [applies equally to 
both].”).  
 200. See supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text. 
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victimized Chinese nationals, while addressing the competing concerns of 
practicality and falsified claims. 
By adhering to the guidelines of this Note, courts can integrate the 
notion of a “traditional marriage” into American jurisprudence. Allowing 
traditionally married couples to be eligible for asylum is integral in the 
struggle to combat the harsh effects of the Policy, but safeguards are 
needed to prevent both abuse and an unmanageable influx of immigrants. 
The Factor Test addresses these concerns by limiting eligibility to valid 
claims through the use of a particularized judicial inquiry in each case.  
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